SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT; NORTH EAST REGION; BORNO

Prepared for: NCDC / Nigeria CoPREP.

OPERATING IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CoPREP	COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
GoN	Government of Nigeria
NCDC	Nigeria CentRer for Disease Control
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
NPHCDA	National Primary Health Care Development Agency
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp
PCU	Project Coordinating Unit
SMF	Security Management Framework
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
VAC	Vaccination Approval Criteria
WB	World Bank
PHC	Primary Health Center
GH	General Hospital
SF	Security Forces
TTP	Tactic Technique and Procedure
MO	Modus Operandi
OCG	Organized Criminal Group
AOG	Armed Opposition Group
CMT	Crisis Management Team
K & R	Kidnap and Ransom
ERW	Explosive Remnant of War
UXO	Unexploded Ordinances
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Support

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

The scope of this Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is specific to Borno, Nigeria. This assessment and report were produced in February 2022. Risk scenarios were identified, and a vulnerability analysis was conducted relative to project personnel activity. A series of mitigation measures were identified for each to reduce personnel risk to as low as practical. The recommended mitigation measures are included in this report and should provide the basis for security plans for activity in the city.

Advice given and recommendations made do not constitute a warranty of future results or an assurance against risk. No express or implied warranty is given in respect of any judgment made or to any changes or unforeseen escalation of any factors affecting any such judgment. Reports are intended for the project only but may be disclosed to other group companies and third-party companies with a direct connection to the subject. Any further distribution may not take place without the prior written consent of Nigeria CoPREP. You agree to indemnify us against any claim and any resulting damages that may be caused by any unauthorised disclosure of such documents.

1. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY SITUATION.

Borno State is a state in the North-East geopolitical zone, bordered by Yobe to the west, Gombe to the southwest, and Adamawa to the south while its eastern border forms part of the national border with Cameroon, its northern border forms part of the national border with Niger, and its northeastern border forms all of the national border with Chad, being the only Nigerian state to border three foreign countries.

The general security situation in Borno remains largely volatile, despite several reported successes achieved by security forces in the last 1 year leading to a significant surrender of armed opposition groups (AOGs). Since the murder of its then leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, the Boko Haram group has grown to become a threat to both internal and international security across the greater Chad Basin. With consistent violent attacks on security forces, civilians, churches, mosques, farms, media houses, schools as well as government buildings, the organization has demonstrated extremes of terrorism.

The group's name has always been *Jamā'atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da'wati wal-Jihād (JAS)*, meaning "Group of the People of Sunnah for Dawa and Jihad". It was also known as *Wilayat Garb Ifrqiya*, meaning "West African Province", and, after the group's leader, Abubakar Shekau, pledged allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in 2015, was briefly called "Islamic State in West Africa" (ISWA) or "Islamic State's West African Province" (ISWAP). The group fractured in 2016, however, and ISWAP and Boko Haram became separate groups.[1]

Since the ousting of Abubakar Shekau, the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) has remained the most active armed opposition group in the state. In May 2021, Abubakar Shekau reportedly killed himself with a suicide vest having refused to surrender, following an ISWAP ambush in the Sambisa forest. Following his death, it is thought that remaining elements of JAS have been brought under the control of ISWAP, even if not formally subsumed into the organisation. Recently, statements credited to the Borno state government suggested that ISWAP is more sophisticated, funded and educated than previously assumed, therefore posing an even greater threat to the state.

The activities of armed groups have posed threats to human security, crippling economic and social activities, as well as forcing people to desert their homes to live with relatives or as IDPs in relatively safer zones. Findings from the World Health Organisation and other humanitarian actors in Borno, indicate that out of the 27 LGAs in the state, 3 LGAs (Abadam, Guzamala and Marte) are inaccessible. Four LGAs (MMC, Bayo, Kwaya Kusar and Shangi) are fully accessible while the remaining LGAs are contested and only partially accessible. Access to contested LGAs is largely only possible using armed SF escorts or the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS). There are 311 political wards in the state, out of which 205 of them are either fully or partially accessible and the remaining totally inaccessible due to the presence and activities of armed opposition groups. It is important to note that, despite the capabilities of the armed opposition groups, the state government's current rehabilitation, resettlement, and reconstruction (RRR) objective has seen all IDP camps within Maiduguri town closed and the displaced persons resettled to their homes/communities.

The activities of terror groups in the state include killing through physical attack, the use of mines and explosives, kidnapping and sexual assault, as well as other crimes, making the state a **HIGH**-risk state.

---

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram

1.1. TERRORISM.

Since 2009, there has been a long-standing threat of terrorism in the state. JAS's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) have traditionally included suicide bombing and direct attacks on civilians. Over the years these TTPs have metamorphosed into break away factions of Ansaru and ISWAP. With Ansaru having no presence in Borno, ISWAP remains the most active and dominant terror group in the state. The group has since held sway particularly in northern Borno and has seen its area of dominance extending to central and southern Borno, attacking mostly security forces formations, government buildings as well as INGO facilities. Associated with the terror attack are directed kidnap of staff under government payroll, INGOs and religious clerics. Major supply routes (MSR) in the state have persistently been under attack, with ambushes and the use of mines and other explosive devices making them only accessible using armed escorts. The 4 major roads include Maiduguri-Damaturu, Maiduguri-Damboa, Maiduguri-Ngala and Maiduguri-Bama roads. Even though the use of suicide bombers and VBIEDs have been common TTPs for JAS, ISWAP has recently increasingly deployed the use of IEDs (at least 35 incidents related to these were reported in 2021) and mines. ISWAP has also utilised equipment won from the Nigerian Army. Mortars are used to support direct attacks on military formations while GRAD rockets have been launched into Maiduguri. The rockets have no precision, making the risk to the public a lot more severe. The possibility of terror attack remains highly likely and, as such, the rating for this risk is **HIGH**.

1.2. CRIME

Crimes such as robbery, theft, fraud, mugging, carjacking, sexual assault are considered medium across the state. Prior to now, the existence of ECOMOG (a politically driven criminal gang) group had seen the crime rate in Borno increase to a significant level (most of whom were used by politicians for political related crimes). Presently, the activities of the group have largely reduced but the economic disparity amongst residents has increased the crime rate where there is a perception that INGO staff are well paid against residents who are not necessarily employed or displaced. The risk of exposure to associated crimes of these nature by staff is considered **MEDIUM**

1.3. CIVIL UNREST.

Civil unrest in the form of protest/demonstrations, political violence and riot remains likely but less likely in the form of communal clash. Administrative policies in schools, distribution of food, WASH, livelihood, or shelter items in IDP camps as well as SF overzealousness on civilians have led to many protests and, in some cases, led to riots. Even though not much has been reported lately, it used to be very common. The likelihood that civil unrest impedes access to vaccination stations as well as causes damage to vaccines and materials or distorts vaccination process remains likely and thereby rated **MEDIUM.**

1.4. TRAVEL RISK.

The risk of road traffic accidents in Borno is considered Low according to available data from the National Bureau of Statistics. In Q1 and Q2 of 2021, from the NBS data, there were 171 casualties resultant from RTA in the state - the lowest in the region when compared to other states. However, this can largely be attributed to the limited number of movements on the roads due to the security constraints. The vulnerable nature of the roads has largely led to the state vaccination team liaising with international partners, such as the WHO to use the UNHAS in accessing difficult to reach LGAs. The risk associated with road travel in the state remains less likely and rated **LOW** based on available data.

1.5. KIDNAP.

Kidnap has become a major threat to operations in Borno and the northeast more generally, due to activities of armed opposition groups. As is common with ISWAP's MO, illegal vehicle check points (IVCP) and armed attack on communities often result in the kidnap of persons of interest by the group, for both ransom or ideological purposes. Also common with terror organizations is the attempt to instill fear in the minds of people. Thus, some of the AOG's kidnap victims have been gruesomely murdered, with videos/photos publicized, following the failure of government, institutions or religious bodies to meet the conditions set. This trend poses a threat to vaccine administration and response. This threat is rated **HIGH.**

1.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

Like COVID-19, cholera also constituted a risk in the 2021. The Borno state cholera outbreak response situation report as at 16-Nov-21 indicated there were 4,432 cases of cholera of which 169 died (cumulative fatality rate of 3.8%) with LGAs like Gwoza, Jere, MMC and Konduga being the most impacted, mostly arising from WASH concerns. As at Dec-2021, according to the WHO report (as in the diagram below), there were 1,629 cases of Covid of which 24 died (cumulative fatality rate of 1.47%), with no cases reported from Abadam, Kukawa, Guzamala, Marte, Magumeri, Kala Balge, Bama, Chibok, Askira Uba and Kwaya Kusar. Due to the humanitarian need in the state, where displaced persons have major WASH and shelter concerns as well as the high temperature in the state, the risk of exposure to diseases in the state is rated **MEDIUM.**

Source: WHO Borno Disease Surveillance Update, Dec 2021

1.7. FIRE EVENT.

There have been many reported cases of fire incidents in Borno. Recent reports indicate there have been a number of fire incidents in IDP camps as well as in the University of Maiduguri hostels. Fire incidents can be caused by the extreme hot weather in the state or by poor electricals respectively. Due to likelihood of fire

incidents, particularly at vaccine stores that require constant power for cold chain management, this can be considered a **MEDIUM** threat that can be reduced to LOW with adequate mitigative measures

1.8. ENVIRONMENT (WEATHER).

While threat of flooding is relatively a lesser threat in Borno, excessive heat and high wind constitutes a major seasonal threat that is likely to impact the CoPREP project. LGAs like Kukawa, Kala Balge that have water bodies have major flood concerns around the peak of the rainy season. There are also occasional flooding cases in Maiduguri as a result of bad drainage systems. Although the average annual temperature in Borno is about 37°C, it can reach as high as 40.1°C in April. High winds cause frequent dust storms which reduce visibility, impact on air operations and can cause a threat to health. This risk is rated as **MEDIUM**.

1.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

All programmatic planning delivery sequencing associated with the administration and emergency response to COVID-19 inclusive of training for staff and stakeholder engagement that could impact on programming, whether in terms of delay or failure, is assessed to be **LOW** based on findings.

1.10. DEPLOYMENT.

There is risk associated with operational and logistics aspects of the programme. Disruption of the deployment network can affect vaccine delivery to vaccination centres, impacting the cold chain and potentially impacting on vaccine efficacy. Over the past year, persistent attacks on power infrastructure have totally denied Maiduguri of power, forcing residents to rely on alternative sources of power, both in the town and elsewhere in the state. Findings from state medical authority revealed both the Ultra Cold Chain (UCC) and the Walk-in Cold Room (WICC) are only powered by standby generators fuelled by the state (providing 15 hours) and supported by INTERSOS (providing 9 hours). At the LGA level, the solar direct drive (SDD) provides an avenue to keep vaccines removed from WICC under the required temperature. Another challenge with deployment is transportation of vaccines to LGAs. Due to the high risk of travel to LGAs, this is partly done by local government cold chain officers, who travel to the state cold store to retrieve vaccines for accessible locations. For the partially accessible locations, they often join a SF provided convoy and, in some instances, use the influence of the WHO team to get the vaccines deployed using UNHAS. The risk associated with this is rated **MEDIUM**

1.11. POLITICAL.

The risk associated with influence of political class, traditional institutions as well as activities of terror groups having the capability to contest control of certain areas, impacting on vaccine roll out and delivery in the state, is considered MEDIUM. Findings reveal that not much support has been received from the traditional institutions in Borno with regards to vaccine roll out. Of the 8 emirate councils in Borno, only 1 of the emirs is reported to have taken the vaccine, leading to a significant hesitancy amongst residents. Additionally, a significant percentage of the state is being contested by terror groups, giving limited access to locations, even though there is very little human populaiton in some of these locations. This risk rated **HIGH**

1.12.   CORRUPTION.

With the massive roll out plan and administration of vaccines at public and private places, chances of corruption amongst staff and the possibility of production of counterfeit vaccines cannot be ruled out. However, findings from the current vaccine delivery process have not indicated a likelihood of staff being dishonest, or engaging in extortion and bribery to short-change the process. This is rated **LOW**

1.13.   COMMUNICATION.

The existence of several conspiracy theories about vaccine administration and the motives behind the vaccination process pose a risk to staff, making them vulnerable to direct/indirect attack, as well as a risk of vaccines being destroyed. Failures in sensitization, coordination, the absence of telecom services (which was recently restored in the state), the existence of fake news and counter narratives all constitute a risk to staff and vaccine roll out. Assessment in the state rates this as a **MEDIUM** risk.

2. EVALUATION OF SECURITY RISKS.

2.1. INTRODUCTION.

In carrying out this risk assessment, a wide range of information sources have been used, including but not limited to:

- Feedback with programme and state government employees via an SRA checklist.
- Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO).
- US Department of State - Bureau of Consular Affairs.
- Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- Open and closed commercial security sources available to Consultant
- Discussion and peer review within the Consultant management team who collectively have a large amount of security and risk assessment experience.

In identifying the key risks, several factors were considered such as:

- The threat of terrorists targeting the vaccination programme.
- The threat of civil unrest in the proximity causing damage to the vaccination locations.
- The risk of natural disasters, particularly flooding and earthquake.
- Reputational, political and financial risks to the donor and programmatic organisation.

The following section entitled Risk Description and Estimation will identify the risks that are considered relevant to this report. For a full description of the probability and impact scores, please refer to Annexes A and B.

3. SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT.

3.1. INDIVIDUAL RISK DESCRIPTION AND ESTIMATION.

3.1.1. TERRORISM.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team or member of the public being killed or injured by a terrorist attack against the vaccination location itself or nearby targets including other building in use by the programme roll out.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
(VBIED) Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device	An attack using a parked or moving vehicle (including lorry, car, motorized rickshaw or moped) to deliver an explosive charge against the entrances or adjacent areas around the programme storage or vaccination delivery points.	Recently, this has become an uncommon TTP amongst the terror group in Borno. However, the use of road planted IED on unpaved roads has continued. Similarly, the risk of exposure to UXO and ERW constitute a significant risk to project staff. In Feb-2022, a leader of CJTF was killed by a road planted IED along Biu-Damboa Road. This type of attack remains **very likely**
(PBIED) Person Borne IED	An attack using a person(s) to deliver an explosive charge(s) to deliver an explosive charge against the entrances or adjacent areas around the programme storage or vaccination delivery points.	This is a recognized method of terrorist attack in Borno where the group use women and children to access locations. In Maiduguri this was reported severally around Muna garage, UNIMAID, cashew plantation, Monday market and Polo axis as well as places of worships. This has gradually become an uncommon TTP amongst ISWAP, but using same strategy to access medical facilities, SF formations and government buildings is **likely**
Armed attack	An attack by single or teams of people using guns, IED's and grenades to injure or kill people at close quarters, either during the attack or by a delayed hostage scenario, using the media to maximum effect.	This is a recognised modus operandi for terrorist groups in the Borno. Medical clinics have been a frequent target for BH/ISWAP during town incursions. In Jan-2022 ISWAP was also reported to have fired rockets into 1000 housing estate killing 6. In January alone, about 89 people were reported killed because of armed attacks. Armed attacks remain **highly likely**

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
1 - Terrorism	**4**	**4**	**HIGH**

3.1.2. CRIME.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being adversely affected by a criminal event such as a mugging, theft, extortion or act of physical violence. Incidence of the vaccination location being targeted by organised criminal elements that has a serious impact on the programme delivery (theft of vaccine, equipment etc.) or reputation of the programme.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Armed Attack	An attack by single or teams of people, including OCGs, using guns to injure or kill people at close quarters. This is often associated with community invasion for looting rustling and kidnap.	A direct risk to staff, either because the programme is directly targeted or collateral damage as a result of being in the proximity to an attack on supporting security forces is more likely to be perpetrated by terror groups and less likely by armed criminal groups. The use of armed escorts in the region increases the risk of being caught in this type of event.
Sexual Attack	Programme member of staff falling victim to a sexual assault resulting in harassment, sexual disease, injury or death.	Incidents of sexual assault occur within Maiduguri as well as in contested LGAs where vulnerable people seek humanitarian intervention. Also, it is likely to be perpetrated by terror groups when holding their victims. Recently, the staff of an INGO was alleged to have sexually assaulted a minor leading to her death. This risk is likely
Organised crime	Infiltration of an organised criminal group into the running of the vaccination programme itself, resulting in fraud, theft, loss of assets/funds, employment malpractice or adverse publicity for NCDC and State Health Ministry if exposed.	Findings indicate syndicates of such criminal groups exists in Borno who have in the past hijacked the procurement process of organizations in the state (from bid to award of contract). The chances that such a similar attempt is made on the vaccination process in the state remains likely
Theft	Programme member of staff falls victim to a criminal act, either losing valuables or money, by mugging or pickpocketing, or some other form of theft from their person or the items are taken whilst unattended in common areas, programme storage or delivery sites, or from staff accommodation.	Where there is a perception that there are highly paid individuals in the community, the likelihood of exposure to mugging, theft, burglary, robbery remains high. Personnel moving alone in unlit roads or staying in homes with limited physical security features, increases risk of exposure for staff and vaccines
Drug taking or smuggling	Instance of drug taking within program premises for individual use, or the taking place of drug dealing either retail, i.e., to users, or wholesale, to other drug dealers. Use of methanol to enhance low grade alcohol resulting in death or injury of the imbiber	Recreational drug taking is widely practiced in some parts of the Borno, particularly around UNIMAID, but not much has been reported around programme premises.
Staff dishonesty	A member of staff engaging in dishonest conduct, such as fraud or embezzlement of funds, equipment or vaccines from the programme itself.	Frauds of this nature have been reported in routine immunization processes where mostly casual staff find a means to benefit from the process. However,

		fraud has not so far been reported from the COVID 19 vaccination exercise.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
2 - Crime	3	3	MEDIUM

3.1.3. CIVIL UNREST.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being adversely affected by unrest caused by rioting, demonstrations, or political violence. Incidence of the vaccination location being targeted by organised criminal elements due to brand ownership of World Bank as an international donor. Any anti-vaccination movement targeting the programme in the form of local protests.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Community clash/ Riot	Incidence of a member of staff or a programme delivery site being caught in a localised civilian clash or riot.	More likely to occur when demonstrations over perceived wrongs are not handled properly. Similar incidents have been reported in the past as a result of excessive use of force by security forces along Baga road, a few kilometres from the Theatre command.
Demonstration/ Protest	Incidence of a member of staff or a programme delivery site being caught in a protest or demonstration either directed towards the programme or a local but unconnected issue.	Recent incidents of protest have been reported in IDP camps before their resettlement. Similarly, there have ben protests by university students over administrative policies. The probability that a demonstration or protest takes place in proximity to vaccination centres, threatening the safety of staff and vaccines, remains likely
Political violence	Incidence of a member of staff or a programme delivery site being affected or injured by political violence associated by an election or local political issue that is associated with the area or specifically in relation to the vaccination programme	An electioneering campaign year usually has increased political violence. A recent violent attack on a lady by political thugs was reported along circular road in MMC. She was alleged to have posted a damaging social media message against a state politician. This event is typical of what can be expected in the year as politicians jostle for political positions. Threats like this have the capability of impacting vaccine roll out.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
3 - Civil Unrest	3	3	MEDIUM

3.1.4. TRAVEL RISK.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team being killed or injured by an exposure to road traffic accident (RTA) when travelling to pick up vaccines from the state or from the LGA as well as to from PHCs to LGA cold chain or when delivering same. Grievous injury could also be sustained as well as death while going for vaccination duties at vaccination centers by staff

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
RTA	Incidence of a programme vehicle being involved in a road traffic accident whilst effecting delivery of personnel or vaccine supplies to programme sites.	RTAs occur regularly due to poor roads, badly maintained vehicles, and poor driving skills. Due to frequency of travel by local government cold chain officers (LCCOs) to ensure regular supply of vaccines, this risk is considered likely.
Vehicle Theft or Hijack	Incidence of a programme vehicle being stolen whilst parked and unattended, or actively hijacked from programme personnel following and encounter with an IVCP.	IVCPs and kidnap is prevalent on Borno's roads. A high value is also placed on 4x4 vehicles by terror groups in the state, the usage of which may mean exposure to hijack.
Boat Accident	Incidence of a boat accident where programme activities require the movement of personnel and stores by water.	Boat accidents occur where poor safety measures are followed – overloading, over speeding and failure to wear life jackets. This mode of transport is likely to be used in Kukawa and Kala Balge LGAs due to water bodies but for the associated risk of travel to such locations
Air Crash	Incidence of chopper crash where programme activities require the movement of personnel and stores by air.	This remains one of the safest means of accessing partially accessible LGAs in the state. The UNHAS choppers are reported to be highly maintained and fly at higher altitude therefore making the risk of exposure to crashes and targeted by AOGs less likely

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
4 - Travel Risk	2	4	MEDIUM

3.1.5. KIDNAP

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team being abducted/taken against his/her will during travel to vaccination points, collection/delivery of vaccines and at vaccination points.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Kidnap for Ransom	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being abducted by organized criminal groups (OCGs) for ransom purposes (K&R)	To ensure continuous supply of arms, ammunitions and its cause, the group kidnaps individuals for monetary gain. In Dec-2021 ISWAP insurgents abducted at least 15 people (including 5 employees of the Borno State Ministry of Work) who were on their way to inspect a road project in the vicinity of Wovi village along the Chibok - Damboa Road, Damboa LGA. This threat of kidnap remains highly likely for project teams.
Express Kidnap (One Chance)	The short-term kidnap of a programme member of staff in order to force the removal of available cash from ATMs.	Express kidnap is particularly prevalent where there is wealth and a high frequency of ATMs, as found in the commercial centres of major cities like Maiduguri where there are 'wealthy' aid workers. This threat remains likely on vaccination team when exposed
Ideological kidnap	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being abducted by organized criminal groups (OCGs) to gain political or other concession.	ISWAP often use the execution of their victims to spread terror and support their media campaigns. In Dec 2019, the group reportedly gruesomely murdered 11 Christians before a camera to spread terror. This is not uncommon with their MO and remains a likely threat

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
5 - Kidnap	3	4	**HIGH**

3.1.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

SCOPE OF RISK:

The contraction of disease, sickness or workplace accident of such severity as to need an emergency response and temporary of long-term hospitalization of a staff member.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Disease	Incidence of a member of staff contracting an endemic disease as a result of their programme delivery and/or interaction with target stakeholders, causing them to be unable to work or requiring their hospitalisation/isolation.	Diseases present a documented health hazard in Borno, although they can be anticipated and treated with specific medication, hygiene and personal health and wellness care. Records of Malaria, Diarrhoea, Cholera and Meningitis have been reported. The threat of this exposure remains likely
Sickness	Incidence of sickness due to personal physiology or due to the ingestion of a sick bug, causing them to be unable to work.	Despite programme and personal sanitary drills, people regularly fall ill due to chronic conditions or food poisoning. The risk of this exposure remains likely
Accident	Incidence of a work-related accident during programme delivery which is of such severity that they are temporarily or permanently unable to continue their duties.	Accidents often occur in work environments and particularly where there are high numbers of people. The risk of serious accident will be reduced by proper planning, rehearsals and the strict adherence to safety SOPs even though this risk remains unlikely due to findings related to demand vs supply of COVID-19 vaccine

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
6 – Medical Emergency	3	3	MEDIUM

3.1.7. FIRE EVENT.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Damage or destruction of a programme facility, related equipment or to personnel, as a result of a fire.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Arson	The malicious use of fire to cause the damage or destruction of programme facilities, equipment or personnel.	The risk that ex-staff, disgruntled staff as well as persons with reservations against the programme set stores and workplaces on fire remains possible, even though no similar reports were reported in the state.
Fire outbreak	The collateral involvement in a fire event causing damage or destruction of programme facilities, equipment or personnel due to the dense and chaotic nature of the urban landscape.	Uncontrolled fires at bins, power surge and lack of adequate fire safety equipment presents a real threat of fire incidents. Cold chain management requires connection to power which forms a risk of fire outbreak where there is poor, shoddy workmanship in premises or loosely connected power cables. Poor electrical workmanship and the chance of power fluctuation means that the risk of a fire outbreak remains likely. Within a space of 2 weeks in Nov-2021, 2 female hostels in the university of Maiduguri were reported to have recorded 2 fire outbreaks leaving 3 injured

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
7 - Fire Event	3	3	**MEDIUM**

3.1.8. ENVIRONMENTAL - NATURAL CATASTROPHES.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team being killed or injured by a natural catastrophe such as tsunami or earthquake. Incidence of the vaccination centre being closed, damaged, or destroyed by such an event. Damage to vaccine stocks or other equipment required for roll out.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Flood	Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured by drowning or crush injuries created by the force of water	At the peak of rainy season, LGAs with water bodies like Kukawa, Kala Balge and parts of Ngala as well as the state capital due to poor drainage system, have been exposed to flooding. More likely to occur between July-September.
High wind	Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured, or the damage or destruction of programme assets, due to very high wind gusts.	The risk is not necessarily from the wind itself but from projectiles picked up and accelerated by the force of the wind. Desert encroachment from the Sahel increases the risk associated with this.
Lightning	Incidence of a progrmme member of staff being killed or injured as a result of lightning.	Usually associated with storms that occur shortly before rainfalls. This has the capability to strike individuals as well as cause serious havoc to buildings, trees etc.
Excessive Heat	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team adversely affected by high heat. Impact to supplies or facilities due to elevated temperatures (e.g., lack of refrigeration to vaccine etc.).	This can affect staff or cooling systems. This may cause heat-related injuries, like heatstroke which, if untreated, can lead to staff death. Excessive heat can also adversely affect functionality of cooling systems, particularly when transporting vaccines with ice packs (Most likely to occur between March-April).

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
8 - Environmental	3	3	MEDIUM

3.1.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

SCOPE OF RISK:

A failure to properly plan delivery sequencing, inform stakeholders and train programme staff in advance of project start, risks unexpected issues which will delay, alarm and potentially cause the failure of the programme.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Covid protocols	A failure to insist on strict Covid protocols at vaccination centres causes these same centres to become Covid supper spreader fulcrums.	Beneficiaries and local stakeholders must be aware of all existing protocols associated with vaccine administration. Findings indicate that protocols form part of sensitization.
ID capture	A failure to capture reliable information on the numbers being vaccinated progressively throughout the programme results in doubts as to data efficacy and ultimately a loss of confidence in the process.	ID card is seen to be manually done but when details (name, dates, vaccine type and QR code) are not adequately captured, it constitutes a failure to programming. The risk associated with this is unlikely
SF discord with Civilian population	Incidence of elements of the supporting security force generating tension due to their discord with the local community.	There have been many alleged reports of human rights abuse by security forces against civilians in Borno causing discord. Recently, civilians along Baga road protested the killing of 1 person by SF. Such discord directed at supporting security forces have the capability of generating tension and maybe vaccine rejection

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
9 - Programmatic	3	3	**MEDIUM**

3.1.10.   DEPLOYMENT.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Operational and logistical aspects of the programme roll out face risk interruption to vaccine delivery to field sites and, potentially, risk to vaccine efficacy if vaccine storage temperatures can't be maintained. In certain areas, distance and poor road conditions could impact on staff deployments and vaccine centre opening/closing times.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Distribution interruption	Poor logistical management causing interruption of vaccine supply to the field, leading to delays in the overall programme	The risk associated with travel along Borno roads has left some locations partially accessible and others inaccessible. Findings have, however, not indicated inability to distribute vaccines to locations so long as there is human existence in specific LGAs. This challenge is only being surmounted by the use of SF armed escorts and UNHAS.
Power Interruption	Incidence of power interruption leading to write off of vaccine stock due to heat damage. (According to brand, Covid 19 vaccines must be stored within a relatively narrow temperature range).	There has been regular power outages in Borno as a result of persistent attacks on power infrastructures for over a year now. Extended power interruption without sufficient back-up systems will negatively impact on vaccine cold chain management system.
Unexpected vaccination window extension	Incidence of interruption to the smooth deployment of stock and medical delivery of vaccinations leading to unplanned extension of the delivery time period.	Unplanned time extensions to programme delivery risk disruption elsewhere in the programme and potentially increase risk to staff due to extended presence in high risk areas.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
10 - Deployment	3	3	MEDIUM

3.1.11.   POLITICAL

SCOPE OF RISK:

The concurrent acceleration of political campaigns in the lead up to the 2023 elections could impinge, tangentially or directly, on the programme's ability to deliver effectively. In certain areas of the state the government's authority and control is challenged as ISWAP declared Caliphates. In these areas there is increased security risk which will challenge the programme's ability to access areas and deliver vaccines.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Elections	Concurrent political campaigns causing dilution to programme communications or directly impacting the effectiveness of the vaccine delivery programme.	Electoral news will take more and more news time as the election nears. Communication of vaccine roll out risks being squeezed out of air time an print space. Political activists could use the vaccine programme as a vehicle to attack the political opposition. This remains likely in Borno
Traditional Rulers	Failure to apply the correct notification protocols in the lead up to vaccine delivery causing a snub to the traditional ruler in that area. A withdrawal of royal or religious approval could result in a loss of buy in by the local community.	A significant percentage of the most influential traditional leaders in the state have not shown support to the vaccine roll out campaign by their body language. Only 1 of the 8 emirs is known to have openly collected the vaccine and urged residents in his emirate to do same. Findings from locals indicate this has increased vaccine hesitancy.
Contested Areas	Incidence of restricted access. Programme delivery might not be possible in certain parts of the country where the legitimate government's authority is being challenged.	A least 3 LGAs in Borno are currently totally inaccessible to civilians due to the dominating presence of terror groups, who have formally declared these areas their caliphate. As much as it applies to these LGAs, it also applies to about 106 political wards currently considered 'No-Go'

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
11 - Political	3	4	**HIGH**

3.1.12.   CORRUPTION.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team to engage in theft or fraud in order to enrich themselves

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Staff dishonesty	A member of staff engaging in dishonest conduct, such as fraud or embezzlement of funds from the programme itself.	Fraud or embezzlement of funds could rapidly sap the tempo and vigour of the vaccine programme roll out, resulting in failure to vaccinate large parts of the population. No reports of such in Borno state but it remains a likely risk.
Extortion	Extraction of resources from the programme by a staff member because they have been place under duress by a third party.	Locally recruited programme staff could be placed in this situation by criminal elements within the local community. No reports of such but remains likely. .
Bribery	Incentivisation of programme staff to disrupt or cause the failure of the vaccine programme.	Politically motivated agents could seek to disrupt the programme to make the incumbent government (federal, state or local) look weak and disorganised. There is no known historical evidence of this risk in Borno state.

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
12 - Corruption	2	3	**LOW**

3.1.13.   COMMUNICATION.

SCOPE OF RISK:

Failure to properly inform and forewarn communities of the vaccine programme could result in poor attendance. Failure to coordinate the sequence of community attendance could result in excessive crowds and increased risk of disorder. The use of social media to publish false news or counter narratives by traditionalists or politically motivated opposition could result in poor attendance or a mass refusal to take the vaccine.

RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Sensitisation	Poor communication and lack of timely programme advertising resulting in low take up of the vaccine amongst communities	Major sensitisation campaigns are currently ongoing in the state; radio jingles and other forms of sensitisations making this risk unlikely.
Coordination	Failure to coordinate attendance scheduling, resulting in excessive queues with long waiting times, generating dissent and potential civil unrest.	The risk associated with bad planning and coordination is low as there is already a level of hesitancy to taking the vaccine amongst the population. Demand is lesser than supply, thus long waiting times and massive queues are unlikely.
False News	Incidence of social media challenges as to the efficacy of the vaccines versus traditional medicines, generating doubt and leading to low turnout at vaccine centres.	The use of social media to sow false information is a recognised problem in countries which already have high vaccine take-up. This has largely impacted the roll out programme with low turn outs for vaccination so far. This is a significant risk.
Counter Narratives	Incidence of anti-establishment commentary suggesting that the vaccine programme is a government plot to infect the population with unknown chemicals, resulting in stakeholder refusal to be vaccinated.	Comments of this sort have been reported in certain quarters in the state, leading to vaccine hesitancy. This is a significant risk.
Telecom Shutdown	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team exposed to incident due to absence of telecommunication services to aid planning and deployment	Due to ongoing operations at the Theatre, the destruction of communications infrastructures at distant LGAs, telecom services are either not available or partially available. Organisations in some of these locations either depend on alternate means of communication or, for those around international borders, depend on foreign telecom services for communication. This has a significant risk to programming

OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
13 - Communication	3	3	MEDIUM

4. ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED SECURITY RISKS (EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL).

	Threat Scenario	Impact		Probability		Risk
1	Terrorism	4	Severe	4	Highly Likely	High
2	Crime	3	Moderate	3.2	Likely	Medium
3	Civil Unsrest	2.8	Moderate	2.8	Likely	Medium
4	Travel risk	4	Severe	2.1	Possible	Medium
5	Kidnap	3.8	Severe	3.2	Likely	High
6	Medical Emergency	2.8	Moderate	2.8	Likely	Medium
7	Fire Event	3	Moderate	2.8	Likely	Medium
8	Environmental (Weather)	2.7	Moderate	3.3	Likely	Medium
9	Programmatic	2	Minor	2	Possible	Low
10	Deployment	3.1	Moderate	2.8	Likely	Medium
11	Political	3.6	Severe	3.4	Likely	High
12	Corruption	2.8	Moderate	1.8	Possible	Low
13	Communication	2.7	Moderate	3	Likely	Medium

The three headline risks are terrorism, kidnapping and political which constitute a High threat of occurrence. All three high risks have impacts that are severe with a probability of occurrence of highly likely or likely. Aside from terrorism, kidnap and political, other risks like crime, civil unrest, travel risk, medical emergency, fire event, weather, deployment, and communication all have significant impacts and likelihood (a minimum of moderate) except for travel risk that has lesser likelihood.

It is important to state that the activities of terror groups in the state is associated with kidnapping which increases the risk of vaccination team members being exposed to armed attack, road planted IED, VBIED as well as being taken against their will. On the other hand, the developing electioneering campaign, the action/inaction of traditional rulers as well as the continuous contest of areas for caliphates by ISWAP mostly in northern Borno constitutes a significant risk to vaccine roll out in the state

Attention must also be given to other risks like civil unrest, travel risk, fire, environmental as well as other internal risks like deployment and communication as they will also impact on vaccine roll out. An element of these risks can be addressed by security design, but equal importance must be placed on security procedures, training and management of staff to reduce them to the lowest level possible.

The remainder of the risks, some of which can have a significant impact, are also unlikely in the context of the current situation in Borno state. Although the tolerance for the risk is unlikely to be any higher, they should become accepted as reasonable norms of operating in such an environment (residual risks). This

does not reduce the requirement to manage them to the lowest level possible and management should consider the introduction of all reasonable precautions as part of its longer-term planning.

5. RISK MITIGATION MEASURES & PLAN.

5.1. INTRODUCTION.

A multi-layered approach to security is effective as it can mitigate risks using generic principles. This section will propose several risk controls for approval by the NCDC programme team and State Government to address the risks identified above. As discussed initially, they will be written as objective statements, i.e., the desired state that is to be achieved, not how to achieve it. As shown below, each control's predicted reduction on its risk will be documented. This will then form the basis for the Security Management Framework, which will be written after this risk assessment has been accepted and signed off by the client.

5.2. INDIVIDUAL RISK MITIGATIONS.

5.2.1. TERRORISM.

RISK CONTROLS:
- Project security adviser will issue advisories on any areas where specific threat is expected based on liaison with local authorities.
- It is clearly impractical that staff avoids all public places, places of worship etc but duty of care suggests informing them of targets as part of security awareness training.
- Avoidance of pattern setting (times, routes, locations, and vehicle/personnel profiles) is to be actively managed by project security focal point.
- Information assurance ('need to know') procedures to be implemented.
- Project should be very cautious with content in media actions needed for communication and sensitisation activities as there is risk of attracting the attentions of OCGs.
- Security Adviser to advice staff to maintain a low profile when working in Borno.
- Emergency response plan for all personnel, to include immediate action on armed attack on a public place or building with staff present.
- Project security manager or security focal point to actively monitor all personnel, especially those on field work outside the office.
- For long distance interstate travel staff are advised to travel in a 2-car convoy with the chase vehicle carrying passengers.
- Identify potential safe haven locations in event of a series of attacks making movement difficult.
- Identify potential evacuation routes in the event of an attack on vaccination centres or facilities frequented.
- Staff to be trained on how to respond to exposure of IEDs (PBIED or VBIED) as well as active shooter incidents.
- Rules of Engagement (RoE) for reaction by supporting security agency to be clearly understood by all.
- Inter LGA staff or vaccine movement by road must get SF clearance
- Project security adviser to provide updated risk ratings for LGAs highlighting 'No-Go' locations
- Where risk of road travel is high, liaise adequately with WHO state team for vaccine and staff deployment by air
- Project management should work on improving acceptance within local community.
- Project staff to adhere to the local curfew time in LGAs as designed by the battalion

NEW RISK SCORE: new Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
1 Terrorism	3	3	MEDIUM

5.2.2. CRIME.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Staff advised to maintain a low profile at all times.
- Security adviser to track criminal trends and events and notify organisation's Management of any significant issues that could affect the project
- Security awareness training to include avoidance of pattern setting information security and management of personal profile.
- Drivers are instructed not to travel in the early morning before 7:00am and after 5pm
- Drivers to be security awareness trained
- High value movements (cash or valuable equipment) to be planned in coordination with security adviser
- For long distance interstate travel staff are advised to travel in a 2-car convoy with the chase vehicle carrying passengers.
- Hotels and extended stay accommodation are audited and approved by security adviser
- Staff are advised on how to improve site security at their individual residences and can seek personal advice from security advisor.
- Emergency response procedure through a local CMT to handle incidents on a case-by-case basis.
- Staff should avoid lone walking in unlit places to avoid exposure to mugging.
- Project security adviser to document locations with trend of sexual assault and make recommendations in terms of staff deployment.
- Project management should work on improving acceptance within local community.
- Improve physical security measures at places of residence

NEW RISK SCORE: new Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
2 Crime	2	2	LOW

5.2.3. CIVIL UNREST.

RISK CONTROLS:

- During election periods work is suspended or reduced as much as possible in the state.
- Security adviser to issue advisories to all personnel including drivers of areas to avoid, based on liaison with local authorities.
- Security adviser to check all proposed routes avoid areas of potential unrest.
- Security personnel working with the project at any point must have been briefed and understand the ESS 4, page 48 of the World Bank ESF. Project RoE must be based on these standards. Issues like unrest, crime, and other physical threats must adhere to these rules.
- Staff to be advised not to participate in protests or demonstrations.
- CMT to include immediate action on civil unrest situation developing.
- Potential safe haven locations for use in event of widespread unrest in the city or vaccination centres to be identified within Emergency Response Plan (ERP).
- Identify potential evacuation routes in the event of protracted unrest in Borno.
- Staff to briefed on the need to avoid political or religious confrontations during induction training.
- Staff to briefed on how to defuse conflicts (de-escalation)

NEW RISK SCORE: new Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
3 Civil Unrest	2	2	LOW

5.2.4. TRAVEL RISK.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Enforce speed limits.
- Driver selection and training based on Borno experience.
- Person responsible to assess rental cars before hire and report as fit for purpose.
- Use of seatbelts must be enforced on project vehicles.
- Staff crossing water bodies must use life jackets (if safe to cross), else if capability of local boat riders seem uncertain, consider avoidance.
- Person responsible to conduct regular (at least monthly) vehicle inspection checks including spare parts and medical equipment.
- Sufficient vehicles should be provided to vaccination and emergency response teams to avoid overload.
- A proper journey management system should be established for the vaccination teams that involves proper planning, monitoring and response to incident.
- Drivers should undergo a defensive driver training programme.
- Cap driving hours of drivers to reduce fatigue and stress. It is noted this is difficult to enforce but it is a serious cause of RTA and the concern cannot be ignored.
- A ban on all vehicle movement after dark.
- Nearest Hospitals and Ambulance services MUST be identified by the project security adviser.
- Contact lists for physicians within the medical facilities need to be established by project security adviser.
- Remote location Med Evac plans should be understood by all travellers
- All guidelines as issued by UNHAS air crew must be adhered to strictly
- Routes known with severe risk of exposure to ambush, road planted IEDs and kidnapping must be avoided. Where delivery of vaccines is necessary but risky, consider risk transfer to a third party

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
4 Travel Risk	2	3	LOW

5.2.5. KIDNAP.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Project security adviser to disseminate any new kidnap specific advice as a priority.
- Kidnap awareness to be included in induction training, pattern setting, information security, reducing profile to kidnappers.
- Staff to maintain a low profile always.
- Hired vehicle drivers should be briefed on kidnap prevention.
- K & R training and preparedness for all staff should be done at least once a year.
- Travel itinerary to be kept confidential and shared on a need-to-know basis.
- Person responsible for journey management to enforce proper management of staff movement in the field.
- Staff Tracking and Journey Management guidelines.
- K & R setup like Proof of Life should be done for staff.
- K & R insurance policy and requirements to be reviewed and advised by project's management.
- ID cards or other visibilities (cap, shirts, vehicles) that gives out staff profile must be avoided following known MO of terror groups where staff of aid organizations and government are mostly targeted

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
5 Kidnap	2	3	LOW

5.2.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Awareness training on measures to prevent infection, including the use of high-concentration insect repellent, COVID 19 PPE (Personal Protective Equipment), protective clothing, and netting at night.
- Organisation to comply with COVID 19 protocols.
- Project security adviser to issue advisories based on emerging health risks as well as COVID 19 infection numbers for Borno state.
- Medical insurance cover must be adequate for private health clinics and medical evacuation.
- Programme Crisis Management Plan to cover medical emergency.
- Signages and information should be displayed throughout the office environments both for visitors and staff on COVID 19 prevention and response numbers.
- Immediate vicinities of clinics, offices, stores, and vaccination centres must be cleared and fumigated in order to minimise presence of vectors.
- Staff should be trained in first response first aid including vector bites
- Eat and drink healthy food and water respectively. Also ensure adequate hygiene at all times

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
6 Medical Emergency	2	2	LOW

5.2.7. FIRE EVENT.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Hotels, offices, stores and PHCs to be assessed by project security adviser for compliance with fire safety standards.
- Staff to be trained during security briefing on procedures and responses to fire emergencies.
- Electricity panels should be properly labelled and secured to prevent electrocution.
- Organisation's storage rooms cold chain equipment must be maintained, functional and adequate.
- Main and alternate muster points identified for evacuating building.
- Fire warden to ensure personnel list available to account for all personnel at office.
- Emergency response plan for fire at all locations to be briefed to new personnel by fire warden.
- Project vehicles to carry firefighting equipment.
- Workmanship done at offices, stores and buildings must be conducted by professionals with adequate records kept.
- Periodic service of firefighting equipment must be done and appropriately recorded.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
7 Fire Event	2	2	LOW

5.2.8. ENVIRONMENTAL (WEATHER).

RISK CONTROLS:

- Project security adviser ensures that selected staff hotels are not located in flood areas.
- 4x4 vehicles that can handle the terrain during severe weather should be provided to field teams where appropriate.
- Project staff must also understand and adhere to the World Bank Environment and Community Health and Safety standards (ESS4).
- Flood alerts to be issued to allow staff to adjust travel plans appropriately.
- Provision of appropriate volume of drinking water to staff when working in excessive temperature.
- Where rivers burst their banks due to excess rainfall, no attempt should be made to cross.
- Lightening resistors should be installed on buildings and particularly avoid vaccination exercises during lightening under trees

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
8 Environmental	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

5.2.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Project staff should be briefed on World Bank health and safety standards contained in World Bank Environment and Social Framework handbook.
- Health and Safety briefings should be given daily to ensure stakeholders are aware of required protocols and procedures.
- Prompt payment of staff salary as well as adequate renumeration for those involved in vaccination process will ensure staff commitment to the programme.
- Project security adviser must monitor relationship between security agencies and the local community to know which agency is the most acceptable to provide security whilst also avoiding negative reactions.
- Improve acceptance in local community by ensuring transparency in all processes
- Battalions and forward operational bases (FOBs) of security forces around vaccination centers as well as relevant stakeholders must be duly informed on programming and implementation

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
9 Programmatic	2	3	LOW

5.2.10. DEPLOYMENT.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Adequate vehicles should be provided to vaccination teams
- Proper planning is required to ensure continuity of the cold chain during deployment (ice packs, cool boxes).
- Generators for alternative source of power must be regularly serviced to ensure vaccine efficacy
- The National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be involved in the vaccination drive. The agency should be actively involved in dispelling fake news about the virus.
- The programme should have a close relationship with security personnel like the police to get security information before deployment. Areas where there may be conflict in the state should be avoided completely or only entered cautiously and with appropriate prior planning.
- A proper journey management process should be established.
- Staff should be briefed on security response to incidents while in the field.
- Frequency of travels by LCCOs to the state for vaccine pick up should be reduced (the more the frequency, the more the risk)

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
10 Deployment	2	2	LOW

5.2.11. POLITICAL.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Due to the coming 2023 elections, the vaccination programme should be conducted as soon as possible. This is important because the closer the programme gets to the coming election the bigger the possibility that an electioneering campaign gets prioritized over vaccination.
- To get adequate buy-in and increase vaccine acceptance, the influence of those traditional and religious leaders close to the people must be cultivated and employed. Emirs at Borno emirates must be seen to embrace the vaccine to dispel conspiracy theories and negative narratives about vaccines
- Project security adviser should identify areas that are contested by armed groups and ensure project staff avoid such locations. Where access is hindered by contesting armed groups, vaccination centres should be coordinated in safer locations
- Considering the volatility of hinterlands, vaccine is best administered at LGA headquarters where SF has a significant presence

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
11 Political	2	3	LOW

5.2.12. CORRUPTION.

RISK CONTROLS:

- Internal control mechanisms, such as due diligence audit process, should be strengthened and transparent to ensure funds and processes are not tampered with.
- Vaccine distribution chain should be adequately monitored to nip any temptation for vaccine theft
- Staff must be trained to administer vaccines on basis of *'first-come first-serve'* rather than discriminating or prioritising stakeholder groups.

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
12 Corruption	1	2	NEGLIGIBLE

5.2.13. COMMUNICATION.

RISK CONTROLS:

- There should be adequate pre-delivery sensitization on vaccine administration using radio jingles and other media to reach remote communities, emphasising the benefits of the vaccination programme and explaining the delivery plan.
- Project security adviser should be involved in planning and site selection to avoid gatherings and excessive queues and rowdy sessions that have the likelihood of further increasing the spread of Covid.
- Alternate means of communication should be provided in places where telecom has been shutdown and other staff encouraged to have multiple SIM cards to stay connected.
- Where a secondary means of communication is used, seek adequate approval for usage from respective security agency

NEW RISK SCORE: new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
13 Communication	2	2	LOW

6. PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR MANAGING RISKS.

6.1. Training

Staff and security agency induction training on SOPs and ERPs
All programme and security agency personnel to be briefed on the delivery framework and RoE.
Vaccination team training and rehearsals.

6.2. Drills

Background vetting.
Covid-19 site protocol.

6.3. Equipment

Dedicated transport fleet.
Vehicle trackers.
Robust IT system and plan for data capture.
Robust cold chain containers with appropriate time specifications for temperature retention.
PPE provision (PHC sanitisation, masks, disinfectants, signage).
Staff ID badges - a risk?
Dual SIM phones.
Sat phones.

6.4. Communication

WhatsApp Alert groups.
'Constant companion' contact card.
RoE card for security personnel.

7. SUMMARY OF SECURITY FINDINGS.

	Threat Scenario	Impact		Probability		Risk
1	Terrorism	3	Moderate	3	Likely	Medium
2	Crime	2	Minor	2	Possible	Low
3	Civil Unrest	2	Minor	2	Possible	Low
4	Travel risk	1.9	Minor	2.1	Possible	Low
5	Kidnap	3	Moderate	2	Possible	Low
6	Medical Emergency	2.1	Minor	1.9	Possible	Low
7	Fire Event	2.2	Minor	1.8	Possible	Low
8	Environmental (Weather)	1	Negligible	2	Possible	Negligible
9	Programmatic	3	Moderate	2	Possible	Low
10	Deployment	2	Minor	2	Possible	Low
11	Political	3	Moderate	2	Possible	Low
12	Corruption	2	Minor	1	Unlikely	Negligible
13	Communication	1.8	Minor	2.2	Possible	Low

The above risk maps are a means of demonstrating the intended reduction in risk, using the proposed controls. The intention is to be able to use these controls to build the Security Management Framework, Emergency Response Plans and the appropriate staff and security training regimen and to accept the residual level of risk left in place. These controls do not guarantee such incidents won't happen, but they reduce the chances of one happening. If one occurs, the impact is minimised, and the chances of recovery are maximised.

The above controls can be grouped into the following broad categories, which will become the basic components of the deployment process and vaccination site mitigations by priority:

- Deployment and Recovery
- Physical barriers and structures, including lighting and other recommend works.
- Access Control – using checkpoints and registration points.
- Covid-19 protocols and PPE availability

- Cold Chain Management
- CoPREP/Security agency protocols and RoE

Security procedures, training standards and contingency plans are key parts of the overall security management. An integrated security solution using people, technology and procedures involves all three aspects, and each must be carefully coordinated with the other two to produce a seamless security environment.

This risk assessment identifies the priority risks and provides a framework against which we identify the current security shortfalls and prioritise the recommended work to mitigate the gaps.